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ABSTRACT
Thispaperinvestigates the discount ratepolicies offive FederalReserve chairmen: Martin, Bums,
Miller, Voicker and Greenspan. Both in terms of the reasons given for making discount rate
changes and the frequency of discount rate changes, the discount rate policies of Martin and
Greenspan were very similar, as were those ofBums and Voicker. The discount rate policy of
Chairman Miller differed from eitherofthese groups. Measured by the money market’s response
to discount rate changes, the discount rate policyofBums and Voicker was the most effective and
Miller’s the least effective. Evidence ispresented that suggests that the differential response is
due to the fact that thediscount rate policy ofBums and Volcker provided the market with more
completeinformation than that ofMartin and Greenspan. The evidence also supports critics of
the Federal Reserve’s discount rate policy prior to theearly 1960s.
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assistance.“Discountpolicy —particularly withrespectto changes in the discountrate — is a
simple and easilyunderstandable technique ofinforming themarketofthe
monetaryauthorities’ viewon the economicandcredit situation. “--Charles
Walker, “Discount Policy in Light ofRecent Experience” JournalofFinance
(May 1957), p. 229.
“Thefinancial community thinks oftheReserveBankdiscountrates aspivotal in
the creditmarket. ..In light ofthisfact, itis onlynatural that thebusinessand
financial communityshouldcommonly interpreta change in the levelofReserve
Banks’ discount rates asan important indication ofthe trendin FederalReserve
policy. “--Board ofGovernors ofthe FederalReserve, The FederalReserve
System,Purposes andFunctions (1963b), p. 45.
“No simple rules govern the interpretations ofchanges in thediscount rate. In
some circumstances a change in thediscountrate mayexpressa sh~fl ofFederal
Reservepolicy toward restraint or ease. In other instances, itmay reflecta
further step in thesame direction. Instill other cases, a change mayrepresent
merelya technicaladjustmentto marketrates... “--Ralph Young, “Tools and
Process ofMonetary Policy,” in UnitedStates Monetary Policy (1964),p. 44.
‘~..discountrate... ‘announcementeffects’arean additional sourceof
uncertainty in the economy. “--MiltonFriedman, A Program ForMonetary
Stability (1960), p. 39.DiscountRatePolicies ofFive Federal Reserve Chairmen Page 2
The role oftheFederalReserve’s discount rate hasbeen controversial. Some [e.g.,
Simmons (1956)] arguedthat the discountrate wasoflittle consequence forthe supply of
reserves because oftheFed’s administration ofthe discount window. Others [e.g., Walker
(1957)] thought discountrate policy to be an effectivemethod ofinforming the marketofthe
Fed’s viewson economic and credit conditions through a so-called announcement effect. Indeed,
the Fed viewed announcements ofdiscountrate changesto be an effective means of
communicatingits policy intentions. Critics [e.g., Friedman (1960), Smith (1956, 1958) and
Young (1964)] argued that the discountrate is changedfor a variety ofreasons, including simply
to bring the discount rateintobetter alignment with market interest rates. Hence, by failing to
acknowledge thereasons forits action, critics argued that likely as not the Fed’sintentions would
be misconstrued. Succumbing to criticism, in the early 1960s the Fed began thepractice of
issuing a statement ofintent alongwith its announcementofa discount rate change.
Research [e.g., Waud (1970), Froyen (1975), Mudd (1979), Brown (1981), Roley and
Troll (1984), Hakkio and Pearce (1992) and Wagster (1993)] has shown that the financial, stock
and foreign exchange markets respond significantly to discount rate changes. Moreover,
Thornton (1982)and subsequent researchers [Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Cook and Hahn
(1988), Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985), Thornton (1986, 1994, 1995)] have shown that
statements ofintent are important forassessing the markets’ reactions to discount ratechanges.
Inparticular, the financial and foreignexchange markets respond only to discountrate changes
whichthe Fed announces are nontechnical, i.e., made forreasons otherthan simply to realign the
discount rateto market rates. Some [e.g., Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) and Batten and Thornton
(1984)] have conjecturedthat the markets do not respond to technical discount rate changesDiscount RatePolicies ofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page 3
because they are anticipated. The evidence [Thornton (1995)] does not support this
interpretation,however. Ratherthe evidence suggests that the marketsdo not respond to
technical discountrate changes simplybecause theyprovidethe market with no relevant
information.
The practice ofissuing a statement ofintent, which began under Chairman Martin, marks a
fundamentalchange in discount ratepolicy. Furthermore, theway this statement has been used
characterizes an important difference in the discount ratepolicies ofFederalReserveChairmen.
This paperexamines the discountrate policies ofthelast five Federal Reserve Chairmen. The
market’s response to differences in the discount rate policies ofthese chairmen is investigated and
analyzed.
I. DiscountRatePolicies ofFive Fed Chairmen
Starting in 1933, throughout WorldWarII, and during most ofthe immediate post-War
period discounting was virtuallynonexistent. In the sixteenyears from 1933 to 1949, discount
and advanceswere below their levelofthe 1920s. Discount ratepolicy was also dormant, The
discountrate was changed only oncebetween February 1934 and December 1947.’
With the establishment ofthe Accord betweenthe Federal Reserveand the Treasury, on
March 3, 1951, discounting resumed an importantrole in monetary policy. Indeed, theFed
elevated discounting to thepoint ofsuggesting that open market operations would be
‘This statementis based on changes in the discount rate oftheFederalReserveBank of
New York. At this time, it was common forthe 12 Federal ReserveBanks to have slightly
different discount rates and to adjust them somewhat differently. The patternofrate adjustments
was similar forthe other 11 Reserve Banks, however.Discount RatePoliciesofFiveFederal ReserveChairmen Page 4
supplementaryto it.2 Initially, theFed relied on what Roosa (1952, 1959) and others described as
banks’ reluctance to borrow from the centralbank to regulatethe level ofborrowing. Borrowing
increased significantly under nonprice rationing, however. By December 1952, discount window
borrowing had increased to $ 1.6 billion — 7.6 percent oftotal reserves. Concernedabout the
level ofborrowing and continual indebtedness ofsome institutions, theFed undertook a
comprehensive reexaminationofdiscounting in 1953, and discount rate policy reemerged.3 The
discount rate, which was changed only once betweenMarch 1951 and December 1953, was
changed ten times betweenFebruary 1954 and December 1957.
This study begins with the revival ofthe use ofthe discount mechanism as a tool of
monetary policy and, in particular, with the revival ofdiscount ratepolicy. It spansthe period
from January 4, 1954 to January 20, 1995, covering all or parts ofthe terms offive Federal
Reservechairmen, Martin, Burns, Miller, Volckerand Greenspan. Prior to the early 1960s, the
Fed simplyannouncedwhenReserveBanks changedtheir discountrate. No reasonswere given
forthe change. Beginning in the early 1960s, the Fed’s announcement included a statement of
intent, stating why the action was taken.4
2In its Annual Report in 1952, theBoard ofGovernors stated that “...the System
contemplated that principal reliancefor additional FederalReserve credit, to support increased
bank loans and investments, would be placed on member bank borrowingfrom FederalReserves
Banks and that open market operations would be limited as much as possible to supplying such
additional demands as might be necessaryto avoidundue restraint.”Board ofGovernors ofthe
FederalReserve (1952), p. 91.
3See Ahearn (1963) for a discussion ofthe revived use ofthe discount rateduring this
period.
4h appears this changein policy occurred with the discountrate change made on July 16,
1963. TheBoard ofGovernors no longer has a copy ofthe press release forthis discount rate
change. According to the announcement in theFederalReserveBulletin, this changewasDiscountRatePolicies ofFive Federal Reserve Chairmen Page 5
Thornton (1982) classified discount rate changes by these statements. Discount rate
changeswere considered technicaliftheaction was taken solelyto bring thediscount rateinto
alignment with market rates and nontechnicalotherwise. Subsequently, Cook and Hahn (1988)
and Thornton(1995) partitionednontechnical discount rate changes by their information content.
This paperfollows thetaxonomy ofThornton (1995). Discount rate changes that are made solely
to realign the discountrate are called technical changes [i~DRT],those that are made for this and
other reasonsare called mixed changes [ADRM] and those made solely for other, policy reasons
are called policy changes [~DR~]. Finally, discountrate changesmade prior to the change in
discount rate policy are called information deficit changes[~DRm], to reflect the criticism of
Friedman, Smith, Youngand others that such discount rate changeswere difficult to interpret
because they containedno specific information.
Table 1 summarizes the discount rate changes madeunder the five FederalReserve
Chairmen. After the Fed, under Chairman Martin, began releasing statements ofintent, all Fed
Chairmen havefollowedthis practice. The only exception wasthe 25 basis-point reduction in the
discount rate made under Chairman Burns onDecember 16, 1971.
These datareveal some marked differences in the discountrate policies ofthe five
chairmen. For example, Chairmen Martin and Greenspan never adjustedthe discountrate solely
to bring it into better alignment with market rates. Furthermore, only three ofthe ten
nontechnical discount rate changesunder Martinwere made in part fortechnical reasons. Fewer
thanhalfofthenontechnical changesunder Greenspan were mixed.
nontechnical and is so classified here. The press release forthenext discount rate change,made
onNovember 23, 1964, is available and the reason forthe change is stated.DiscountRatePolicies ofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page6
In contrast,morethan halfofthe discount ratechangesunder Burns and Voickerwere
made solely to realign the administered rate. Indeed, the first five discount rate changesunder
Burns were technical. Furthermore, abouttwo-thirds ofthenontechnical changes made under
these chairmen were mixed. In contrast,morethan halfofGreenspan’s changes and nearlythree
fourths ofMartin’s changes (followingthe change in discount ratepolicy)were made solely for
policy reasons.
Thetable also shows a marked difference in the frequency ofdiscount rate changesmade
by these chairmen. Miller is without peers. Injust 17 months, Miller changed thediscount rate
seven times. In contrast, Martin and Greenspan adjustedthe discount rate infrequently. Martin
changedthe discountratejust 30 times in the 193 monthsofhis term covered by our sample.
Greenspan changed the discount rate slightly less frequently, making just 13 changes in the first
90 monthsofhis term. Burns and Volckerchanged the discount rate abouttwice as often as
Martin and Greenspan, changing the discountrate 26 and 28 times, respectively, in the 96 months
oftheirterms.
Interms ofboth the type ofchange and the frequency ofchange the discount rate policies
ofBurns and Volckerare quite similar, as are the discount rate policiesofMartin and Greenspan.
The discountrate policies ofboth ofthese pairings ofchairmen differed dramatically from that of
Miller.
II. TheMarket’sReaction to DiscountRate Changes
This sample contains six technical discountrate changes, 11 nontechnical changes and 21
information-deficit changes that are not included in previous work. Consequently, before
investigating whether differences in the discount ratepolicies resulted in differences in the moneyDiscount RatePoliciesofFive FederalReserve Chairmen Page 7
market’s reactionto discountrate changes, it is important to test the robustnessofseveralresults
previouslyestablished in the literature and to investigate the market’s reactionto information-
deficient discountrate changes. Consequently, theequation
=+ ~3(L)&~ + a1LIDRT + a2ADRM + a3ADR~+ a4LIDRJD + ~, (1)
was estimated. M~ denotesthe tth observationon either thechange in thefederal funds rate
(~tFFR) or the3-month T-bill rate (z~TB3).The nth~order polynomialin the lag operator, L,
~(L) = ~ + ~1L + ~2L2+ .. . + ~ is included in this and all subsequent regressionsto
control for the effects ofpast information on theinterest rate,but is not reported.5
Forthe T-bill ratethe period covered is January 4, 1954 to January 20, 1995. Due to the
availability ofdata, theperiod is slightly shorter, July 1, 1954 to January 20, 1995, whenthe funds
rateis the dependent variable. The shorter period has two fewer discount rate changes, both
information-deficient changes.6
The federal funds market was very thin formuchofthe 1950s and 1960s.7 Therewere
extended periods where the daily change in the federal funds rateis identically zero.8 Thefederal
5The order ofthis distributed lagwas 10. Thornton (1995) also included a distributed lag
ofthe federal fundsrate whenthe T-bill rate is the dependent variable, but sincethe results are
unaffected by thedistributed lag ofthe fundsrate, it is not included here.
6The numbers ofdiscount rate changesreportedin the tables are forthelonger sample.
7The Board ofGovernors (1959) reports that through muchofthe 1950sthe average daily
volume offederal funds trading was estimatedto be only about 4 to 10 percent ofrequired
reserves. Nichols (1965)reports similar results, with peak fundstrading relativeto required
reserves ofless than 20 percent.
8This could also be due to thefact that the funds ratewas initially reported in eighths. It
may also be the casethat the reported basis forthe rate changed at some point. See Nichols’DiscountRate PoliciesofFive FederalReserve Chairmen Page 8
fundsrate beganto take on the characteristicsofa fully functioning market only by the early
1970s.9 Some ofthe unusual results reported for thefunds ratebelow undoubtedly reflect this
feature ofthese data.’°
The change in the discountrate is thepercentage-point change on the day that a
discount rate change was first announced. The federal funds rateis a weighted average of
rates on daily transactionsfor a group offederal fundsbrokers and is compiled by the Federal
Reserve Bank ofNew York. The Treasury rate is taken at “market close,” about 4:00 p.m.
E.S.T. Changes in the discountrate are aligned with changes in market interest rates so that
the changein the relevant rate can reflect announcements ofdiscount rate changes.”
Estimates ofEquation 1 using daily dataare presented in Table 2.12 They confirmtwo
(1965) discussion ofthe federal funds rate. We were unable to confirmthis possibility, however.
TheBoardofGovernors maintains that the rate has always been calculated as a weighted average
oftransactionsfor a group ofbrokers. The number ofbrokers usedto calculatethe rate has
changed over time, however.
9By this time, therewere relatively few days where the funds rate did not change by at
least a fewbasis points and ratemovements were no longer in multiples ofeighths.
‘°Themarked differences in the response ofthefederal funds and T-bill ratethat is
sometimes reportedhere is not characteristic oftherest ofthis literature, most ofwhich included
datasincethe early 1970s
“Thiswas done by examining the official press release announcing discountrate changes.
Allbut 19 ofthe releases had the precisetime ofthe release. Inthese 19 cases, it was assumed
the practice ofannouncingthe discountrate actionjust afterthemarket closed was followed.
12 This and all other equations were adjustedforheteroskedasticity using a two-step GLS
procedure. The equations were initially estimated with ordinary leastsquares (OLS). Estimates
oftheresidualsform theOLS were partitioned into different periods and separate estimates of
the standard errors foreach period were made. The data were then transformedwith theusual
square-roottransformation and OLS wasreapplied to the transformed data. See the addendum
to Table 2 for moredetails.DiscountRate PoliciesofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmnen Page 9
important results in the literature; markets do not respondto technical discount rate changes and
the markets respond equally to mixed and pure policy discount rate changes. The estimated
responses to these two types ofdiscount rate changes arevery similar forTB3 and are not
significantly differentfor either rate. In addition, Table 2 reveals that the market responds to
information-deficient discount ratechanges, and the reaction is quantitatively similar to that of
mixed and policy discountrate changes.
It is importantto testtherobustness ofthe results for information-deficient discount rate
changesfortwo reasons. First, it is possible to get a statistically significant coefficient with only a
few significant responses on particular days.’3 Second, Friedman, Smith and Youngarguedthat
by failing to state the reasonsfor theiractions, theFed’s intent in changing the discount rate could
be misconstrued. Since the Fed hasacknowledged that some ofthese discount ratechanges were
purelytechnical in nature,“designed merely to keepthe discount rates in line with market rates,”
evidencethat themarketsresponded consistently to information-deficient discount rate changes
would suggest that theFed’s critics were correct.’4
The robustness ofthe result forinformation-deficient discount rate changeswas
investigatedby partitioning ADRm into two groups, A and B. Group A hasthefirst N discount
rate changes; groupB has the rest. The equation is estimated and the null hypothesis that the
coefficientsfor groupsA and B are equalis tested. Discount rate changes arethen added to
group A and deletedfrom group B and the hypothesis ofequality is againtested. This procedure
‘3This led Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) to provide evidencefor a specific interpretation of
the market’sfailure to react to technical discount ratechanges that is demonstrably incorrect. See
Thornton (1995) fordetails.
‘4Board ofGovernors (1963a), p. 123.DiscountRate PoliciesofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page 10
was repeated, eachtime with more discount rate changes in group A and fewer in groupB.
Finally, information-deficientdiscount rate changes arepartitioned into three groups, A, B, and C.
The resultsoftheseestimates and the test results are summarized in Table 3. The
coefficient estimates vary considerably forthefederal funds rate; however, generallytheyare
significant at the 10 percent level. Moreover, the null hypothesis ofequality is never rejectedat
the 5 percent level. The instability ofthe coefficient is likely due to thethinness ofthe federal
funds market and the lackofday-to-dayvariation in the fundsrate during this period. The results
forthe T-bill rate are robust. The coefficient estimatesare quite stableand are always significant
at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the null hypothesis ofequality is never rejected at the 5 percent
level.
The statistical significance ofthe market’s responseto information-deficientdiscount rate
changes and, in particular, its robustness, suggests that the market consistently inferred something
about the Fed’sintentions based solely on its actions. The evidence suggests that, were ittold
that some ofthesediscount rate changeswere merely technical adjustments ofthe discount rate,
the market would not have responded to these changes. Since no informationwas provided, the
market appearsto have inferred some greater significancethan was intended to these“technical”
discount rate changes.
A. TheMarket’sReaction to TheDiscountRatePolicies
ofFive Fed Chairmen
Sincethe market doesnot respondto them, technical discount rate changes are not
considered in theremaining analyses. Also, sincethere is no basis fordifferentiating between
mixed and policy discountrate changes and because ofthe small number ofeachtypefor eachDiscount RatePolicies ofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page 11
chairman, mixed and policy discountrate changes are combined into nontechnical discountrate
changes, [ADR,~].
To investigatewhether the market responded differently to discount ratepolicies ofthe
five Fed chairmen, nontechnical discount rate changes are partitionedby the chairmanunder
which theywere made.’5 Information-deficient discount rate changes areincluded separately.
Estimatesofthis equation are presentedin Table 4.
Theprimary feature ofthese results is that differences in the responseto the discountrate
changesmadeunder these chairmen are consistent with differences in theirdiscount ratepolicies
revealed in Table 1. The market’s response to nontechnical discount rate changesunder Burns
and Volckerarevery similar, as are theirdiscount rate policies. The response to discount rate
changesunder these chairmen is quantitatively similar forboth the federal funds and T-bill rate,
and in neither case is the difference statistically significant.
A similar result is obtained forthe T-bill ratefor discount rate changesunder Martin and
Greenspan. The difference is significant atthe 5 percent level, however. Interestingly enough,
the fundsrate did not respond significantly to theten nontechnical changesunder Martin. While
problematic, this likely reflects thenature ofthe funds market and the funds ratedata at the time.
Inaddition, consistent with observed differences in his discount rate policy, theresponse
to nontechnical changesunder Miller is different, and generally smaller, than that ofthe other
‘5Some have conjectured that theresponse to discount ratechanges might vary with the
Fed’soperating procedure, such asit change from federal funds rateto nonborrowed reserves
targeting and back again. However, Thornton (1995) presents evidence that the response to
discount rate changes is invariantto changes in the Fed’s operating procedure.Discount RatePolicies ofFiveFederalReserve Chairmnen Page 12
chairmen. This is particularly true forthe T-bill rate, where the response to discount rate changes
under Miller is significantly different from the others, with the exception ofMartin.
B. WhyDoes theMarketRespondsD?fferently to
Alternative DiscountRatePolicies?
Theseresults suggest that the difference in the market’sresponse is attributable to
differences in discount rate policies. The discount rate policies ofthese chairmen differ by the
reasonsgiven forthe action and thefrequencyofthe action. Hence, the observed difference in
themarket’sresponse must be tied to one orthe otherofthese characteristics. For example, it
might be that the relatively small response to discount ratechangesunder Miller is due to the fact
that he changedthediscount rate frequently. Like the responseto the boy who criedwolf, the
market turned a deafearto Miller’s discountrate adjustments. The shortness ofMiller’sterm,
however, makes this interpretation somewhat unlikely. In any event, there are so fewdiscount
rate changesunder Miller — apparentlydue solely to the shortness ofhis term — that it is virtually
impossible to test this or any other hypothesis.
The discount rate policies ofMartin and Greenspan and Burns and Volcker differboth in
the frequencyofthe change and by the types ofdiscount ratechanges made. It seems more likely
that differences in the market’s response to the discount rate policies ofthese chairmen areto the
types rather thanfrequencyofdiscount rate changes. Much ofthe differencein the frequencyof
the change is due to the fact that Burns and Volckerindicated that some oftheir discountrate
adjustments were made solely to realign thediscount rate. Iftechnical discount ratechanges are
ignored, the frequency ofdiscount rate changes evens out considerably. Martin, Voicker, and
Greenspan made nontechnical discountrate changes an averageof0.16, 0.18 and 0.14 times perDiscountRatePoliciesofFiveFederalReserve Chairmen Page 13
month, respectively,whileBurns madenontechnical changes somewhat less frequently, an
averageof0.10 times per month.
The discountrate policiesofMartin and Greenspan and Burns and Volcker differ
fundamentally in the amount ofinformationtheyprovide to the market. By stating that some
discountrate changes are made solely to realign the rate, Burns and Volckeracknowledged what
themarket knows to be true — not all discountrate changesare made for policy reasons. Equally
important, they enabled the market to identif~j discount ratechanges that were made solelyto
realign the discount ratefrom other, policy changes.
By never acknowledging that some discount rate changesare made solely to realign the
discountrate, Martin and Greenspan forced themarket to sort things out on its own. Inthis
respect, there is no differencebetweenthe discountrate policy ofMartin and Greenspan and the
discountrate policy oftheFed priorto its decisionto issue a statementofintent. Inboth cases
the market knewthat some discount rate changeswere made solelyto realign the administered
rate, but had no wayto distinguish these discount ratechanges from others.
Inlight ofthese differences in discountrate policies, the differential responsesreported in
Table 4 is not surprising. Ifthe important information is whethera discount rate change is
motivated by policy considerations, and ifthe market had difficulty distinguishing those which
were motivated out ofpolicy considerations from those intended solely to realign the discount
rate (perhaps because ofthetendency ofall discount rate changes, regardless oftype, to follow
ratherthanlead the market [Thornton (1995)]), theresponseto nontechnical changes under Burns
and Volckershould be larger than to nontechnical changes under Martin and Greenspan.DiscountRatePolicies ofFiveFederalReserve Chairmen Page 14
To illustrate this is so, let X~ denote the market’s responseto policy discount rate
changes,X1 denotes themarket’s responseto discount ratechanges made solely to realign the
discountrate andP denotesthe probability ofa policy discount rate change. Without information
to distinguishbetweenpolicy and realignment changes, the expected market response, ~, would
be,
x = PX~+ (1-P)XT.
The evidence suggests that XT = 0, so that in the absence ofinformationto distinguishbetween
policy and other discountrate changes, ~ = P X~.Ifthe market is toldwhich changesare made
solely to realign thediscount rate, however, then P = 1 and X = X,~.
By acknowledgingwhen changeswere madesolely to realign the discount rate,Burns and
Voickerprovided themarket with useful information. The market responds relatively more to
discountrate changeswhich Burns and Volcker identified asnontechnical, because it has greater
assurancethat nontechnical changesare not made solely to realign thediscount rate.
By not providingthis information, the discount rate policiesofMartin and Greenspan and
Martinprior to the decisionto release a statement ofintent confounded the reaction ofpolicy and
technical discountrate changes. Unableto clearlydistinguish those made solely as technical
adjustments from others, themarket infers some probability that every discount rate change is a
technical adjustment.
Ifthis hypothesis is correct, we might expect to find a differential response to mixed and
policy discountrate changes under the discount rate policy ofBurns and Volcker, but not under
that ofMartin and Greenspan. Because Burns and Volcker identified technical discount rateDiscount Rate PoliciesofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page 15
changes, the market does not haveto make this distinction. Consequently, when Burns and
Voickerannounced, as they infrequently did, that the discount rate was beingadjusted solely for
policy reasons, the market may haveattributed somewhat more significanceto these changes.
Martin and Greenspan not only did not helpthe market differentiatebetweentechnical and
nontechnical changes, they attributed most oftheirnontechnical changes solely to policy
considerations. This suggested something that the market almost certainlybelieved was untrue,
namely, that discount rate changes were seldom made, even in part, to realign the discountrate.
Hence, themarket not only would have difficulty distinguishing betweentechnical and
nontechnical changes, but would have difficulty distinguishing betweenthose motivated solely by
policy and those which were not.
Also, the informationcontent ofdiscount rate announcementsunder Martin and
Greenspan and Martinprior to the early 1960s was the same. Sincethe informationcontent of
thesediscountrate policies is qualitatively similar, so too should be the market’s quantitative
response. Forthis reason, not only should the market’s response to mixed and policy changes
under Martinand Greenspan be very similar, but they should be very similar to the responseto
information-deficient changes.
C. Tests oft/seDiscountRatePolicies ofBurns and Volcker
andMartin and Greenspan
To testthe hypothesis that differences in information account fordifferences in the
market’s reaction, Burns and Volcker [BV] nontechnical discount ratechanges are partitioned
into mixed and policy changes, as are those ofMartin and Greenspan [MAG]. Estimateswith
nontechnical discount rate changes partitioned in this way and test results are reported in Table 5DiscountRatePoliciesofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page16
[L~DRID and Miller nontechnical discount ratechanges, L~DRNT,are also included]. The results for
the federal fundsrate are again problematic and generally do not support the hypothesis. The
response to mixed discount rate changes is largerthanto policy changes. This is true forboth
MAOand BV; however, the differences arenot statistically significant. The response to both
typesofdiscount rate changes underMartin and Greenspan is smaller thanforBurns and Volcker
and the differences are significant. Inaddition the responseto information-deficientdiscount rate
changes is larger thanthat ofeither mixed or policy changes under MAG, however, the
differences are not significant.
The results forthe T-bill rate arebroadly consistent with the hypothesis. The responseto
policy changesunder Burns and Voicker is about a third largerthan the response to mixed
changes. This difference is not significant at the 5 percent level, however, it is significant atthe 10
percent level.’6 Hence, it appearsthat by clearly indicating when discount rate changeswere
made solely fortechnical reasons, Burns and Volckergained some credibility whenthey
announced that discount rate changes were made purelyfor policy reasons.
Likewise, as hypothesized, theresponse to MAOmixed and policy discountrate changes
are nearlyidentical and nearlyidentical to the responseto information-deficient discount rate
changes and the null hypothesis ofequality is not rejected. These results support the notionthat
‘61t should be noted, that the first discount ratechange under Volckerwas a policy change
and wasannounced simultaneous with the Fed’s announcementofa changein its operating
procedureby focusing more attention on monetary aggregates and less on the federal funds rate.
Consequently, this discount rate changeprovoked a very large reaction in market rates [see for
example, Cook and Hahn (1988), Thornton (1982, 1995)]. Deleting this change from theBV
policy changes has a relatively small effect on the coefficient, reducingit from 0.4827 to 0.4552,
and virtually no effect on theresponse to mixed discount ratechanges. However, the null
hypothesis ofequality oftheresponseto mixed and policy discount rate changes is no longer
rejected at the 10 percent level. The F-statistic is 1.9417.DiscountRatePolicies ofFive FederalReserve Chairmen Page 17
never stating why a discount rate change is made is similar in information content to always
stating that discountrate changes aremade for policy related reasons. The market knows neither
is accurate. Hence, in either case, it must attempt to sort out the truth on its own. Both discount
ratepolicies providethe sameinformation and, consequently, the same response.’7
It is interestingto note that ifthe point estimate ofADR~ is taken to be the pure policy
response, i.e., X~ = 0.4827, and the average point estimate ofthe responses to MAO and
information-deficient changes in thediscount rate are taken asthe estimateof~, i.e., ~ = 0.2209,
theestimate ofP, i.e., 0.2209/0.4827, is 0.45 8. This is nearly identical to the ratio ofpolicy to the
sum ofpolicy and technical changes reported in Table 1, 0.463 [25/54]. These figures are
remarkably similar and are consistent with the hypothesis that whenuninformed,the markets infer
some probability that the discount ratechangewas merely a technical realignment ofthe rate.
III. Conclusions
Prior to the early 1960s, the FederalReserve simply announced changes in the discount
ratewithout giving a reason forits action. Succumbing to pressure from critics [e.g., Friedman
(1960), Smith (1956, 1958)and Young (1964)] the Fed, under chairman Martin, began stating the
reasons forits actions. Thereasonsfor discountrate changes and theirfrequencycharacterize
fundamental differences in the discount ratepolicies. Usingthese criteria,the discount rate
policies ofthe last five chairmen oftheFederal Reserve were reviewed. We find that the discount
‘7In an attempt to provide additional evidence, the equations reported in Table 5 were
estimated by including the average spread betweenthe federal funds and discount rate. Ifthe
market interpretedsome discountrate changes as being partially technical, the response to
discountrate changes get smaller as the spread gets larger. This variable was negative and
statistically significant only forthe T-bill rate. The coefficient was extremely small, however.
Moreover, including this variable had no effect onthe magnitude ofthe responseto mixed and
policy discountrate changes.DiscountRatePolicies ofFiveFederalReserve Chairmen Page 18
rate policies ofMartin and Greenspan are essentiallythe same, as arethe discount rate policies of
Burns and Volcker. The discount rate policy ofMiller differs significantly from the others.
Consistentwith the criticismsofFriedman, Smith and Young, we find that the market
responded consistently to discount ratechanges made prior to its decisionto issue a statementof
intent alongwith discount rate announcements. Thefacts that (1) theFed has acknowledged that
some ofthese discountrate changeswere made solelyto realign the discountrate,the market
consistently fails to respond to discount rate changesthat the Fed announces are made solely to
realign the discount rate and the market consistently responded to informationdeficient discount
rate changes implies that the intent oftheFed was sometimes misconstrued.
Inaddition, wefind that the market responds differentlyto the discountrate changes made
under these chairmen in a manner consistent with observed differences in their discount rate
policies. That is, the responseto thediscount rate changesunder Burns and Volckerare nearly
identical, as are theirdiscount rate policies. Likewise, the discount rate policiesofMartin and
Greenspan arevery similar and so too is the response ofthe market to discount rate changes made
under these chairmen. Also,just like his discount ratepolicy, the response to discount rate
changes under Miller differs from the responses to those ofthe other chairmen. Hence, it appears
that differences in the market’s responseto discount rate changes madeunder thedifferent
chairmen are due to identifiable differences in theirdiscount ratepolicies — discount ratepolicy
doesmake a difference!
Themarket’s response to nontechnical discount ratechangeswas the largestunder the
discount rate policy ofBurns and Volcker. We hypothesize that the difference in the market’s
responseto the discount ratepolicy ofBurns and Volcker is due to the fact that they provided theDiscountRate PoliciesofFiveFederal Reserve Chairmen Page 19
market with moreinformation. In particular, by indicating which discountrate changeswere
made solely to realign the discount rate and which were not, Burns and Volcker spared themarket
this task. Incontrast, by theirfailure to acknowledge what themarket knewto be true, namely,
that some discount rate changesare made solelyto realign the discount rate, thediscount rate
policy ofMartin and Greenspan and the discount rate policy ofMartinprior to the early 1960s
forced themarket to makethis distinction on its own.
We hypothesized that differences in information under the different discountrate policies
accounts forobserved differences in the market’s responseto nontechnical discount rate changes
under these policies. Specifically, wehypothesized that the market’s response to policy changes
under Burns and Volcker should be larger than to other nontechnical discount rate changes, while
the response to policy and other nontechnical changes would be the sameunder thepolicy of
Martin and Greenspan. Moreover, we argued that theresponse to policy and other nontechnical
changesunder Martin and Greenspan should be the same as the responseto information deficient
discount ratechangesunder thediscount ratepolicy ofMartinprior to the early 1960s. Evidence
consistent with this hypothesis is presented.
The irony is that announcingdiscount rate changes that are made solely fortechnical
reasons provide no information, so the market doesnot respondto discount ratechanges which
the Fed identifies asbeingmade solely to realign the discount rate. Yet, failing to admit what the
market knows to be true, i.e., that some discountrate changes aremade solely to realign the
discount rate, appearsto confound the signal that discount ratechanges are intended to
communicate.DiscountRate PoliciesofFive Federal Reserve Chairmen Page 20
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January 4, 1954 through January 20, 1995
Chairmen ofthe Federal Reserve 1
Type Martin Burns Miller Voicker Greenspan Total
L~DRT 0 16 2 11 0 29
I~DRM 363 11 6 29
I~DR~ 7 3 267 25
/~DR,D 20 1 0 00 21
Total 30 26 7 [ 28 13 104
Term’ 193 96 17 96 90
1/Term term of the chairman in months during thesample period.
Chairman Term
William McChesney Martin April 2, 1951 - January 31, 1970
Authur F. Burns February 1, 1970 - January 31, 1978
G. William Miller March 8, 1978 - August 6, 1979
Paul A. Volcker August 6, 1979 - August 11, 1987
































1/ F-statistic forthe null hypothesis that theresponse to L~DRM and L~DR~ are equal.
Absolute valueoft-statistics in parentheses.
*Indicates statistical significance atthe 5% level.Table 2, continued
This equation wasestimated using a general procedureof adjusting forheteroscedasticity by
grouping periods with different variances. Specifically, the model
y1
= X,13 + e,, i = 1, 2,. ..N, was estimated using ordinary least squares, OLS. It is assmumed
thatE( , ,‘) = 0~2I for all i. The equationwas then re-estimated using generalized least
squares, i.e., ~ = (X’O’X)~’X’~’Y, where, = (~ 23 EN)’ andE[ ‘] = ~), adiagonal
matrix. For more details about thisapproach see Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984, pp. 174-76).
The data are partitioned as below andare the partitions are the same for all of the estimated
equations. The estimated variances changed very little, from equation to equation.
Consequently, only the estimated standard errors for the estimates in Table 2 arepresented.
Estimated Standard Errors
LiFFR i~TB3
Period Estimate Period Estimate
7/1/54-5/23/60 0.2109 1/4/53-1/24/58 0.0372
5/24/60-2/27/62 0.5396 1/25/58-9/15/61 0.0674
2/28/62-5/26/66 0.1846 9/16/61-5/26/66 0.0199
5/27/66-3/3/67 0.3792 5/27/66-7/25/73 0.0627
3/4/67-4/21/69 0.1924 7/26/73-7/3/75 0. 1720
4/22/69-7/3/70 0.5586 7/4/75-9/10/79 0.0753
7/4/70-12/5/75 0.2388 9/1 1/79-11/29/82 0.2718
12/6/75-9/10/79 0.1110 11/30/82-8/6/90 0.0768




first andlast day 1.3303



























































2.275 -- -- F-test
[14, 7]
0. 1491 -- --
F-test
[6,6,7]
0.5382 -- -- F-test
[7,7,7]
0.1598 -- --
Absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses.
*Jndicates statistical significance at the 5% levelTable 4: Response to NonTechnical Discount Rate Changes By Chairman

















































All are equal 2.6227* 8.2008*
Absolute valueoft-statistics in parentheses.












































MAG i~DRM=MAG z1DR~ 0.6716 0.4592
BV z~DRM=BV EiDR~ 1.3754 3.1266
MAG ADRM=BV LIDRM 49357* 3.5599
MAGADR~=BVE~DR~ 4~3534* 21.1003*
MAG 1~DRM=~DRp=~DR,D 1.6687 0.2420
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
*Indjcates statistical significance at the 5% level.